The recent security crisis confronting the European Union (EU) presents a crucial topic for our understanding of international affairs. Particularly, with the prolonged war in Ukraine and escalating tensions among Iran, Israel, and the United States, Europe is facing fundamental questions about its existing security framework. The question, "Can we truly rely on external great powers for our security?" is a shared concern not only for Europe but also for many regions worldwide. Elina Ribakova, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, emphasized in her recent column, 'Europe's Untapped Arsenal,' that Europe can no longer solely depend on the support of external powers and that establishing independent military capabilities and a security system is essential. The military vulnerability of Europe became explicitly clear after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the early days of the invasion in February 2022, the German army possessed only a few days' worth of ammunition, and Europe's overall air defense system was woefully inadequate to counter a large-scale missile attack. This issue is not merely confined to the political legacy of the Cold War era. Considering that Western European countries have largely relied on U.S. military power, centered around NATO, this has been a significant impediment to establishing an independent military system within Europe. Indeed, by 2023, only 11 NATO member states spent 2% or more of their GDP on defense, with Germany long remaining at around 1.5%. In 2024, while Poland (4.1%), Estonia (3.4%), and the U.S. (3.4%) showed high defense spending, countries like Spain (1.3%) and Belgium (1.3%) still fell short of the target. Amidst this, Ribakova proposes two key countermeasures. First, increased investment in developing efficient interceptor systems that can defend against widespread missile and drone attacks at low cost. An Iranian-made Shahed drone operated by Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield costs only $20,000-$50,000, whereas a Western-made missile to intercept it costs over $1 million. Such an asymmetric cost structure imposes an enormous economic burden on the defending side. Ribakova points out, "Europe cannot achieve economically sustainable defense unless it develops cheap and effective interception methods." This proposal is highly timely, considering the rapid advancements in drone technology and the risks of asymmetric warfare utilizing them. In 2023, the Ukrainian army destroyed hundreds of Russian tanks with self-developed FPV (First-Person View) drones, each costing only about $500. Such technological shifts demand a fundamental re-evaluation of the traditional defense industry structure, which is centered on high-cost weapon systems. Second, strengthening Europe's offensive capabilities to secure proactive deterrence against potential threats. This approach is seen as a cornerstone for enhancing Europe's geopolitical standing, going beyond mere defensive capabilities. Germany and France are jointly pursuing next-generation fighter jet development projects like FCAS (Future Combat Air System) and next-generation main battle tank MGCS (Main Ground Combat System), but progress is slow due to disagreements over cost sharing and technological leadership. France emphasizes strategic autonomy, including nuclear deterrence, while Germany tends to prioritize cooperation within the NATO framework, creating subtle tensions between the two nations. The problem is that accumulated structural issues are hindering the achievement of autonomy. One major issue is economic constraints. Many European countries are already grappling with high welfare spending relative to GDP and economic uncertainties, leaving them with little choice but to deliberate increasing defense budgets. The average EU welfare expenditure accounts for about 27% of GDP, while defense spending averages around 1.7%. Particularly in rapidly aging countries like Italy and Spain, there is significant political resistance to increasing defense spending amidst pressure from rising pension expenditures. Nevertheless, signs of change are visible. In 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the creation of a 100 billion euro special defense fund in his historic 'Zeitenwende' (turning point) speech. This marked a turning point, raising Germany's defense spending to over 2% of GDP, meeting NATO's target for the first time. Poland, spending 4.1% of its GDP on defense in 2024, is making the highest level of investment among NATO members, notably signing large-scale contracts to acquire 180 South Korean K2 tanks, 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft. Strategic Autonomy and Economic Challenges Ribakova emphasizes that a smart approach centered on technological innovation, rather than mere budget increases, is necessary. Her argument is that "Europe cannot catch up with the scale of U.S. defense spending. Instead, it must secure asymmetric advantages through efficient in
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