Election Results Shake Global Order As the 2024 US presidential election concludes, the world is once again focusing on the potential shifts in American foreign policy. The election outcome is not merely a change in domestic political power within the US; it is highly likely to become the catalyst for reshaping the global geopolitical order. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are fueling this debate by analyzing these changes from different perspectives. This debate is not solely an American issue; it is a matter that will send ripples across East Asian nations, including South Korea, and indeed the entire world. In particular, the potential resurgence of a Trump administration or a similar foreign policy stance suggests that 'America First' could once again take center stage. In an opinion piece titled 'America First 2.0: A Crisis for Alliances or a New Reality?' in The New York Times' opinion section, Emma Goldberg raises concerns that America First 2.0 would weaken multilateralism and cause anxiety among allies. She recalls instances during the Trump administration when the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement and pressured NATO member states to increase their defense spending, analyzing that these actions led allies to question American leadership. Countries like South Korea, which underwent defense cost-sharing negotiations, directly experienced these effects. In contrast, The Wall Street Journal presents a contrasting view in its editorial, 'A New World Order Led by a Strong America.' The WSJ editorial board argues that America First provides allies with an opportunity to strengthen their independent defense capabilities and can serve as a catalyst for reforming the inefficiencies of the existing international order. Indeed, NATO member states agreed to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP after the 2014 Wales Summit, and since 2016, many members have boosted their defense budgets, reinforcing their national defense postures. The WSJ positively assesses a new world order where allies share greater responsibility under strong American leadership. How might such potential shifts in US foreign policy affect East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula? On the Korean Peninsula, US foreign policy is directly linked to relations with North Korea, which in turn impacts inter-Korean relations. The Trump administration pursued summits with North Korea in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi and Panmunjom in 2019, bringing the Korean Peninsula issue to the international negotiating table. However, this approach did not lead to substantive denuclearization measures by North Korea, and inter-Korean relations remained stagnant. In contrast, the Biden administration adhered to more traditional diplomatic methods, focusing on cooperation with allies to deter North Korea. This served as an opportunity to reaffirm the role of US Forces Korea (USFK) and highlight the South Korean government's diplomatic negotiation capabilities. The ROK-US alliance has functioned as a core pillar of security on the Korean Peninsula for over 70 years since the signing of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. Currently, approximately 28,000 USFK personnel are stationed in South Korea, responding to threats from North Korea. However, the issue of defense cost-sharing has been a continuous point of contention between the two nations. During the Trump administration, the US demanded a significant increase in defense contributions from South Korea, which sparked political controversy within the country. The 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was only concluded in 2021 after prolonged negotiations. Clash Between Multilateralism and America First There is a broad consensus among experts that the outcome of the US presidential election will have a decisive impact on the future of the ROK-US alliance. The alliance is expanding beyond security to include economic and technological cooperation. In particular, collaboration in high-tech industries such as semiconductors, batteries, and biotechnology is strengthening between the two countries, linking to the strategic goal of securing supply chain stability. The US passed the CHIPS Act in 2022 to bolster its domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, and South Korean companies are also making significant investments within the US. However, some express concerns that a resurgence of 'America First' could limit South Korea's economic interests. For instance, the South Korean semiconductor industry could face the risk of losing one of its crucial markets due to US sanctions policies against China. China is one of the primary destinations for South Korean semiconductor exports, and as US-China technological competition intensifies, South Korean companies may be forced to make difficult choices. Concurrently, there is a possibility that defense cost-sharing negotiations could re-emerge as a heated issue, potentially escalating political controversy. On another front, the outcome of th
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